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I. Removing “Uneasiness”
We can imagine a family—or any other tightly bonded social unit,
for that matter—in which it is accepted, celebrated, and, furthermore,
expected, and expected at a deep normative level, that things will be done
the way they have always been done in the family. The faithful life of
this particular family will ever amount to constructing and re-constructing its future along the lines, and only along the lines, that it has
already entrenched as norms, customs, and rules. The best this family
can do, pursuant to its own normative commitments, is to make of itself the best possible instance of the principles it already accepts. Let
us call this family an instance of constructivism.1 Life is always a work
in progress, and in the case of this family the construction project is
limited to what can be made of the conceptual Tinkertoys already in
the family box.

* Professor of Law and John F. Scarpa Chair in Catholic Legal Studies, Villanova University School of Law. I am grateful to Professor Lynn Wardle for the invitation to prepare and
deliver this paper at the Symposium on Whether Legalization of Same-Sex Marriage Is Constitutionally
Required at the J. Reuben Clark Law School at Brigham Young University, held November 2,
2012. I also wish to express my thanks to the other speakers, especially Scott FitzGibbon, Augusto
Zimmerman, and Ursula Cristina Basset, for their helpful comments on this paper and to the
BYU law students for their interesting conversation and exemplary hospitality.
1. On constructivism as a philosophical concept, see Constructivism in Practical
Philosophy (James Lenman & Yonatan Shemmer eds., 2012).
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We can also imagine a family—or any other tightly bonded social
unit—in which inherited norms, customs, and rules are presumptively
decisive, yet also open to revision as insight grows into what has been
handed down. No family can live every day as if it were its first, but
measured openness to change offers cause for hope. To be sure, there
is risk in this open way of living; the future could be better, or it could
be worse, than the past or the present. Either way, though, it will be
more alive because it will not be just a matter of “wash, rinse, repeat”
until the sun no longer shines. It will be more alive due to its openness
to the deep springs of reality that do not, and never could, enter human
understanding all at once, or once and for all. The best this family can
do is to make of itself the best possible instance of what nature and
grace indicate and docile inquiry brings to light, progressively and cumulatively, over time. Let us call this family an instance of Greco-Catholicism. Its project is to live the truth, veritatem agere.
The differences between these two sorts of families are reduplicated, mutatis mutandis, in states and in the cultures that drive states.
States and cultures can be rigid constructivist edifices, or they can be
developing works in progress toward the truth. The constructivist state
has a limited number of principles from which to work.2 The GrecoCatholic state, by contrast, has the whole range of being, both natural
and supernatural, at its disposal, at least in potency.
What has all of this to do with the question of whether same-sex
unions should be recognized at law? Not what one might at first blush
be tempted to suppose.
The contemporary American constructivist is apt to conclude that
he has a ready rejoinder to the call for legal recognition of same-sex
union. According to the self-confident constructivist, marriage should
be defined as exclusively between one man and one woman for the
simple reason that this is the way we have always defined it in the
United States. The constructivist reasons that opposite-sex union is
the only relevant concept we have to work with in the inherited box.
To be sure, the constructivist is likely to have some quite flattering
things to say on behalf of the principles and concepts to which he is
committed, and some or perhaps all of these flatteries may even be

2. Ronald Dworkin’s jurisprudence is an instance of constructivism. Dworkin gives the
example of using dinosaur fossils (Tinkertoys) to construct the best dinosaur we (think we) can,
not to recreate or approximate the real dinosaur whose fossils we have found. See Steven Guest,
Ronald Dworkin 149 (2d ed. 1997). Modernity is a long and fruitless love affair with the formless.

324

323]

Same-Sex Union, the Summum Bonum, and Equality

true. The constructivist’s distinguishing mark, however, is that his future will resemble his past, regardless of the truth vel non of his principles. He’s prepared to stand by those principles, come what may. The
recent practice of redefining marriage to include couples of the same
sex must be repudiated posthaste, according to the constructivist, exactly because it violates the grundnorm of constructivism—a closed system. For a pure constructivist, the existence of the inherited oppositesex definition of marriage is sufficient justification for denying legal
recognition to same-sex unions. The constructivist has imposed what
Eric Voegelin refers to as an “interdict on the question.”3
What I would say in reply to the constructivist is “not so fast.” The
constructivist approach to the same-sex union question suffers the following national embarrassment: the principles to which this nation was
dedicated at its Founding cut in favor of—not against—recognition of
same-sex unions. True, Americans have almost always defined marriage as between individuals of the opposite sex, but most contemporary American opponents of legal recognition of same-sex union are
committed, on a practical and a principled basis, to the constructivist
project that took shape in the period preceding 1776 and extending
through 1789. Those I have in mind, many of whom self-describe as
“neo-conservatives,” are fundamentalists about the principles on
which this nation was founded and to which it has ever since been
proudly dedicated. When it comes to same-sex unions, this fundamentalism makes them hoist of their own petard, though they hardly see it
coming.
But here it comes: who will rise to deny that the United States was
founded, above all, to give constitutional effect to the opening salvo of
the Declaration of Independence, the following moral idea that was
first expressed by John Locke: all men “must be allowed to pursue their
happiness, nay, cannot be hindered. . . .”?4 The transcendent point for
Locke and his disciples, moreover, is that the “happiness” they champion is not man’s summum bonum as understood in the Greco-Catholic
tradition. For Lockeans, the pursuit of happiness boils down to neither
more nor less than the removal of “uneasiness.”5 Period. “Lockean
3. Eric Voegelin, Order and History: The Ecumenic Age 330 (1974) (“This interdict on the Question is the symptom of a self-contradiction which makes the existentially open
participation in the process of reality impossible.”).
4. John Locke, The Works of John Locke in Nine Volumes: The Reasonableness of Christianity, as Delivered in the Scriptures 149 (London, C. Baldwin, 12th ed.
1824), available at http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.b3924434.
5. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding 105 (Kenneth P.

325

BYU Journal of Public Law

[Vol. 27

man is as easily troubled as he is easily contented.”6 To the achievement of this latter, modest end, civil society seeks to “procur[e],
preserv[e], and advanc[e] . . . civil interests,” such as “life, liberty,
health, and indolency of body; and the possession of outward things,
such as money, lands, houses, furniture, and the like,”7 and nothing
more than that, certainly not the care of souls.8
In the innocuous-sounding Lockean language of the pursuit of
happiness is contained the concentrated germ of the revolution known
as liberalism. And it is a revolution that keeps on giving, for it is beyond
obvious that recognizing same-sex unions would indeed remove considerable “uneasiness” for persons who wish to be united with a person
of the same sex. Dedication to—or even acceptance of—“happiness”
as the removal of “uneasiness” militates in favor of legal recognition of
same-sex unions. Scandalous though it may sound to some, those committed to the nation’s founding principle of the pursuit of happiness as
the (mere) removal of “uneasiness” are required, on pain of inconsistency, to give legal effect to same sex unions.

II. The First Creedal Nation in Human History
What, then, are such constructivists to do? One possible response
is to concede the nation’s Lockean pedigree, but point out that Locke
himself recognized marriage as a pre-state society between man and
woman. The latter point, about Locke’s understanding of marriage, is
true as far as it goes, but it does not go nearly far enough. To begin
with, one can ask whether Locke’s defense of “conjugal society,” as he
prefers to call it, amounts to a deliberate, strategic inconsistency on
Locke’s part. One need not be a Straussian to acknowledge that Locke
is a slippery soul. Locke’s (partial) defense of marriage certainly masks
the implications of his novel account of happiness. The question that
merits serious attention is the following: can restricting marriage to
opposite-sex unions be defended without contradicting Locke’s basic
commitment to happiness as the removal of uneasiness? Does Locke’s
account of happiness, when taken for all it is worth, not sublate his

Winkler ed., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1996) (1689).
6. Pierre Manent, The City of Man 131 (Marc A. LePain trans., Princeton Univ.
Press 1998) (1994); see also Michael P. Zuckert, Launching Liberalism: On Lockean Political Philosophy 11, 224 (2002).
7. John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, in The Selected Political Writings
of John Locke 125, 129 (Paul E. Sigmund ed., Norton Critical ed. 2005).
8. On the specific prohibition against care of souls, see infra text accompanying note 78.
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definition of marriage? Or does Locke privilege marriage over “happiness,” the very sin alleged by contemporary advocates of same-sex marriage?
The “conjugal society” Locke defends is not remotely what tradition understood marriage to be: an indissoluble life-long union.9 Marriage, as Locke expounds it, already shows a novel plasticity. It amounts
to a union that is freely terminable when the couple’s offspring are old
enough “to provide for themselves.”10 According to Locke,
[T]he father, who is bound to take care for those he hath begot, is
under an obligation to continue in conjugal society with the same
woman longer than other creatures, whose young being able to subsist of themselves before the time of procreation returns again, the
conjugal bond dissolves of itself, and they are at liberty, till Hymen
at his usual anniversary season summons them again to choose new
mates.11

Locke is adamant that “the chief, if not the only reason, why the
male and female in mankind are tied to a longer conjunction than other
creatures” is the longer dependency of human children.12 With children out of the way, Locke’s civil society has no interest in conjugal
society. Although Locke does show an unexpected interest in progenitiveness, this does not lead him to defend traditional marriage; instead
he contends that “barren women may be divorced.”13 What limited defense of marriage Locke advances runs out when children are not part
of the picture.
Another possible reply available to the constructivist is to deny that
the nation was dedicated to Lockeanism to the extent that I have contended, and or work to show that the elements of its constructivist project are, therefore, more varied, and perhaps more traditional, than I

9. See John Witte, Jr., From Sacrament to Contract: Marriage, Religion, and
Law in the Western Tradition 31, 46, 283–85, 289–90 (2d ed. 2012).
10. John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, in The Selected Political Writings of John Locke, supra note 7, at 17, 50; see also id. at 50–52 [hereinafter Locke, The Second
Treatise of Government].
11. Id. at 51 (footnote omitted).
12. Id.
13. John Locke, Locke: Political Essays xxvi, 255–57 (Mark Goldie ed., 1997) [hereinafter Locke, Political Essays]; see also Jeremy Waldron, God, Locke, and Equality:
Christian Foundations of John Locke’s Political Thought 21–43 (2002); Rachel Weil,
Political Passions: Gender, the Family, and Political Argument in England 1680–
1714, at 28–30 (1999). Locke’s objection to “adultery, incest, and sodomy” is that they interfere
with the “increase of mankind.” John Locke, The First Treatise of Government, in The Selected
Political Writings of John Locke, supra note 7, at 11.
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have contended. Be that as it may, it suffices for my present purpose to
counter that, to the extent that the nation is dedicated to Locke’s understanding of happiness enshrined in the American scripture—that is the
Declaration of Independence—to that extent marriage cannot be limited to opposite-sex unions. I view that extent to be great indeed, as do
others with understanding more learned than my own.
Consider G.K. Chesterton’s typically trenchant insight that
“America is the only nation in the world that is founded on a creed.
That creed is set forth with dogmatic and even theological lucidity in
the Declaration of Independence.”14 Pauline Maier was not claiming
anything shocking when she entitled her book about the Declaration’s
drafting American Scripture.15 And, as Chesterton goes on to say, America is “a nation with the soul of a church.”16 By taking on “a churchly
function in becoming the community of righteousness,” the American
nation became “the primary agent of God’s meaningful activity in history . . . .”17 As Christopher Ferrara has observed in this vein, “Lincoln
was not employing a mere trope in his declaration that ‘when the people rise in masses in behalf of the Union and the liberties of their country, truly it may be said, “The gates of hell shall not prevail against
them.”’”18 The late Richard John Neuhaus, doyen of American neoconservatives, can hardly wait to confirm the point: “America is the first
creedal nation in human history. America did not just happen. It was professed into being. In that sense, America is the first universal nation, for
all who are convinced can join in professing its creed. . .”19 And the first
article of that creed is that all men have a right to “the pursuit of happiness” by the removal of “uneasiness.”
It is beyond dispute that this nation was founded to give effect to
the then-emergent creed of what we now refer to as liberal political
14. Christopher A. Ferrara, Liberty, the God that Failed: Policing the Sacred
and the Myth-Making of the Secular State, from Locke to Obama 604 (2012) (quoting
21 G.K. Chesterton, The Collected Works of G.K. Chesterton (1990)).
15. Pauline Maier, American Scripture: Making the Declaration of Independence (1998).
16. Ferrara, supra note 14, at 604 (quoting Chesterton, supra note 14, at 41–45)).
17. Id. at 605.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 605 (quoting Richard John Neuhaus, Doing Well and Doing Good 4
(1992)). For a compendious survey of the extensive literature about the extent to which the founders and the founding documents were Lockean, see The Selected Political Writings of
John Locke, supra note 7, at 386–98. As I indicate below, in Section IV of this Article, I agree
with Christopher Ferrara’s account of how the radical Enlightenment, including the thought of
Locke, led to the founding of the nation and, over time, to the current dilemma of legalizing
same-sex unions.
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theory. As Mark Tushnet has explained unexceptionably, “[t]he philosophical basis for liberal political theory came from a reaction against
the theology of Catholicism. . . .”20 “The liberal tradition accommodated religion,” Tushnet continues, “by relegating it to the sphere of
private life, a sphere whose connections to public life were of essentially no interest.”21 While the founders were not all “liberals,” some
being civic republicans, they were all but united in rejecting the Catholic understanding of man, the state, and the Church.22 It is not an
exaggeration to say that a principal purpose behind this nation’s founding was to create a polity devoid of the Catholic Church and her traditional teaching about the nature of human happiness.23 Locke was
one among many influential anti-Catholic founders and supporters.
And now, as the founders’ Founders’ liberal principles continue to
work themselves pure, as the saying has it, the time has finally come
for the Greco-Catholic understanding of marriage to go, for it has no
place in the anti-Catholic creed.
It should go without saying that the Greco-Catholic tradition is
not now—nor has it ever been—opposed to happiness, correctly understood. Rather than as the removal of “uneasiness” in the exercise of
negative liberty, however, that tradition teaches that man has a summum bonum, in which his happiness consists. It is given by nature,
awaits discovery by human intelligence, and is to be achieved. And it is,
furthermore, the role of the state to assist man, including by prudent
use of the compulsion of law, in discovering and achieving that summum bonum. This, again, is exactly what the Founders meant to rule
out, and today’s constructivists are keen to follow the Founders’ rules.
Make no mistake about it: “the question regarding the summum bonum,
the supreme good of man, which is the primary question raised by the
tradition . . . is a perfectly idle question for Locke.”24

20. Mark Tushnet, The Constitution of Religion, 18 Conn. L. Rev. 701, 731 (1986).
21. Id. at 731–32.
22. For a mostly admiring account of the steady growth of Lockean liberalism in the country’s life and constitutional law, see Nelson Tebbe, Religious Institutionalism and Constitutional Argument, J. Contemp. Legal Issues (forthcoming 2013).
23. The founders’ and their immediate successors’ antipathy for all things Catholic is staggering. For a summary, see Alan Brownstein, Protecting the Religious Liberty of Institutions, J. Contemp. Legal Issues (forthcoming 2013).
24. Manent, supra note 6, at 130. The “new Lockean notion of ‘the pursuit of happiness’
[is] explicitly opposed to the classical idea of a ‘summum bonum,’ or attainment of happiness.”
Thomas Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism 20 (1988).
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III. To Live the Truth
But what, then, is to be done about same-sex unions at law if, as is
the case, the nation’s founding ideas are Lockean and otherwise liberal,
rather than Greco-Catholic? Does this nation’s constitutional commitment not require that the state implement through law the Lockean
rather than the Greco-Catholic conception of happiness? James Madison in Federalist No. 14 gushed that it was the glory of the American
people to have “accomplished a revolution which has no parallel in the
annals of human society. They reared the fabrics of governments
which have no model on the face of the globe. . . . If their works betray
imperfections, we wonder at the fewness of them.”25 Is it not a matter
of first importance to be faithful to the fabrics of government they
reared? Locke, “the confused man’s Hobbes,”26 anticipated this very
issue and, of course, answered proleptically in the affirmative. According to Locke in the Second Treatise of Government, “he that has once, by
actual agreement, and any express declaration, given his consent to be of
any commonwealth, is perpetually and indispensably obliged to be, and remain unalterably a subject to it, and can never be again in the liberty of
the state of nature; unless, by any calamity, the government he was
under comes to be dissolved, or else by some public act cuts him off
from being any longer a member of it.”27 In an unmistakable reference
to the Catholic Church and the papacy, Locke adds: “nor can any oaths
to any foreign power whatsoever, or any domestic subordinate power,
discharge any member of society from his obedience to the legislative . . . .”28 Does this not mean that American citizens are precluded
from in engaging in non-revolutionary resistance to what is ordained
by the legislative power?
I answer “no.” Locke’s meaning is clear, but his theses are, in my
estimation, mistaken. Again, it is a central tenet of Greco-Catholic philosophy that man is to live the truth, veritatem agere, and from this it
follows that no particular piece or constellation of pieces of positive
law can conclusively block that project, even if Lockean philosophy
insists otherwise.29 The fully human project entails that human living
25. The Federalist No. 14, at 80 (James Madison) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898).
26. C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism:
Hobbes to Locke 25 (1962).
27. Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, supra note 10, at 70–71 (emphasis added).
28. Id. at 75–76, cited in Ferrara, supra note 14, at 73.
29. For a compendious and classic statement of the Greco-Catholic position, see Josef
Pieper, Living the Truth 171 (1989) (“Moral action is ‘doing the truth,’ veritatem agere.”).
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is not to be exhaustively determined by whatever conceptual Tinkertoys happen to have been accumulated in a particular cultural box,
even if that box be called a Declaration or a Constitution. Constructivism is morally untenable per se and not just in its Lockean form. It is
always available, indeed morally exigent, for men and societies to have
further recourse—in prudent and structured ways—to the ends given
by nature, in creation, and by supernature, in redemption. It is a fact
about the human condition that “knowledge makes a slow, if not a
bloody, entrance,”30 and sometimes even entire cultures can become
distorted by error, even on a matter as basic as the nature of happiness.
“So it is,” as Bernard Lonergan observes,
that commonly men have to pay a double price for their personal attainment of authenticity. Not only have they to undo their own lapses
from righteousness but more grievously they have to discover what
is wrong in the tradition they have inherited and they have to struggle
against the massive undertow it sets up.31

Neither Locke nor any other mortal is authorized to issue a laborsaving, history-stopping dispensation.
It seems to me inescapable and even obvious that the Lockean heritage of this nation is on the side of legal recognition of same-sex unions. The refusal to grant legal recognition to same-sex union, furthermore, cannot be had on the cheap, at least if it is to be a principled
refusal. In order to avoid—on honest grounds—granting such recognition, it is necessary to call into question, indeed to repudiate, central
ideas that drove this nation’s founding and have shaped its subsequent
history. Much of what today passes as neo-conservativism in this nation boils down to revolutionary crypto-Lockeanism by another (and
quite misleading) name. I would suggest that the moment has come for
neo-cons to double down, so to speak. The time is ripe, indeed overdue, to loosen the hold of the dead hand of Locke and to take up once
again the cause of politics rooted in truth. As the saying goes, statecraft
is soul-craft writ large, and souls can be lost. Sadly, it took the issue of
marriage itself, the very condition of the possibility of the continuation
of humanity, to clarify the deadly drift of a nation dedicated to happiness as no more than the removal of “uneasiness.” Now is the time for
the constructivist “conservative” to convert to Greco-Catholicism.

30. Bernard J.F. Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding 186 (Philosophical Library 3d ed. 1970).
31. Bernard J.F. Lonergan, A Third Collection 121 (Frederick E. Crowe ed., 1985).
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IV. Judge Reinhardt’s Follies
Returning to the question of Locke’s own influence on the founding of the United States, my contestable claim—which certainly flies
in the face of the mythology about this being a “Christian nation,”—
deserves extensive justification. That justification has recently been
given elsewhere, specifically by Christopher A. Ferrara in his book Liberty, The God That Failed: Policing the Sacred and Constructing the Myths
of the Secular State, from Locke to Obama.32 I commend Ferrara’s book
to the reader’s attention. In my judgment, it precludes Peter Augustine
Lawler’s optative judgment that the nation was “built better than [the
founders] knew.”33
For present purposes I ask the reader to accept my stipulation that
the nation was founded and dedicated to “liberty” understood as (what
the philosophers refer to as) “negative liberty,”—that is, the right to
be let alone in the “pursuit of happiness” by the removal of “uneasiness.” As John Milbank states on the jacket of Liberty, the God that
Failed, “Ferrara’s book most persuasively demonstrates that negative
liberty is an idol and that liberalism is the last of the ideologies. Indeed
he shows that it was the basic ideology hidden behind all the others.”34
I consider it to be uncontroversial to observe that, except in the context
of showing how the “pursuit of happiness” leads to the requirement of
legal recognition of same-sex marriage, most Americans are keen to
declare—and not just on the Fourth of July—that this nation is dedicated to the pursuit of happiness for all. By “happiness” they emphatically do not mean the achievement of man’s summum bonum.
If the reader is inclined to doubt the truth of my stipulation, however, and even if the reader does not doubt it, it is worthwhile to recollect that a majority of what often passes (erroneously) as a “conservative” Supreme Court no longer find the entailments, at least, of such a
founding principle to be the least bit controversial. Needless to say, I
am referring to Lawrence v. Texas, the case that perhaps more than any
other provides the background against which debate about the possible
constitutional requirement of legal recognition of same-sex union goes
forward. Justice Anthony Kennedy’s majority opinion begins with this

32. Ferrara, supra note 14.
33. Peter Augustine Lawler, Better Than They Knew: A Response to Patrick Deneen, On the
Square (Jan. 25, 2013), http://www.firstthings.com/onthesquare/2013/01/better-than-theyknew-a-response-to-patrick-deneen.
34. Ferrara, supra note 14, at jacket.
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now-well-known paean to a particular, and historically eccentric, understanding of liberty:
Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling or other private places. In our tradition the State
is not omnipresent in the home. And there are other spheres of our
lives and existence, outside the home, where the State should not be
a dominant presence. Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought,
belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct. The instant case involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and in its more transcendent dimensions.35

The Court was not so blinded by its enthrallment with negative
liberty that it forgot to remind students of its opinion that “injury to a
person” is not constitutionally protected.36 But having implicitly concluded that the pursuit of what the Court referred to as “a homosexual
lifestyle” causes no such injury, the Court held that “[t]he Texas statute
furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into
the personal and private life of the individual.”37
Justice Antonin Scalia captured the Lockean underpinning of the
Court’s pseudo-analysis, as well as its entailments, in just one sentence:
“[T]he Court simply describes petitioners’ conduct as ‘an exercise of
their liberty’—which it undoubtedly is—and proceeds to apply an unheard-of form of rational-basis review that will have far-reaching implications beyond this case.”38 With respect to those implications, Justice Scalia observed as follows:
State laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity are
likewise sustainable only in light of Bowers’ validation of laws based
on moral choices. Every single one of these laws is called into question by today’s decision; the Court makes no effort to cabin the scope
of its decision to exclude them from its holding. See ante, at 572 (noting “an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection
to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex” (emphasis added)). The impossibility of distinguishing homosexuality from other traditional “morals” offenses is
precisely why Bowers rejected the rational-basis challenge. “The law,”

35.
36.
37.
38.

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
Id. at 567.
Id. at 578.
Id. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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it said, “is constantly based on notions of morality, and if all laws representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under the
Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed.”39

What a massive disruption of the current social order, therefore,
the overruling of Bowers entails.40
And so it has. Lawrence was decided in 2003, just a decade ago, and now
we can fast forward to 2010 and Judge Vaughan Walker’s opinion in
Perry v. Schwarzenegger overturning California’s Proposition 8 that defined marriage as between a man and a woman. Among his findings of
fact, Judge Walker includes the following assertion about the illegitimacy of moral judgment as a valid ground for state action:“In the absence of a rational basis, what remains of the proponents’ case is an
inference, amply supported by evidence in the record, that Proposition
8 was premised on the belief that same-sex couples simply are not as
good as opposite-sex couples.”41
Needless to say, Judge Walker’s citations to Romer, Moreno, and
Palmore, for the proposition that moral judgment, as such, is an unacceptable basis for legislation, are wholly unavailing.
But Judge Stephen Reinhardt, in the Ninth Circuit Court’s opinion upholding the district court 2–1,42 was happy to extend Judge
Walker’s novel analysis. Judge Reinhardt conceded that California’s
Proposition 8 was not subject to any heightened scrutiny for the simple
reason that the U.S. Supreme Court has never held that sexual orientation is a suspect classification. Judge Reinhardt acknowledged that
Proposition 8 was subject to the lower hurdle of rational-basis review,
but he concluded that it did not clear even that low hurdle. Although
Judge Reinhardt admitted that “[a]s a general rule, states may use their

39. Id. at 590 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986)).
40. Id.
41. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Perry
v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom., Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 786
(2012). Walker continues:
Whether that belief is based on moral disapproval of homosexuality, animus towards
gays and lesbians or simply a belief that a relationship between a man and a woman is
inherently better than a relationship between two men or two women, this belief is not
a proper basis on which to legislate.
Id. (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996); Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528,
534 (1973); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)).
42. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom., Hollingsworth v.
Perry, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012).
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police powers to regulate the ‘morals’ of their population,”43 he immediately eviscerated this concession and echoed Walker by asserting that
moral judgment, as such, does not constitute a legitimate state interest,
and that “animus, negative attitudes, fear, a bare desire to harm, and
moral disapproval” are equally unconstitutional grounds for legislation.44 A remark by Justice O’Connor in her concurrence in Lawrence
v. Texas supports Judge Reinhardt’s assertion: “Indeed, we have never
held that moral disapproval, without any other asserted state interest,
is a sufficient rationale under the Equal Protection Clause to justify a
law that discriminates among groups of persons.”45 Judge Reinhardt
speculates that “[t]he Lawrence majority opinion seems to have implicitly agreed” with Justice O’Connor’s remark, from which putative fact
Judge Reinhardt would have us conclude that moral judgment, as such,
is not a legitimate state interest as a matter of Supreme Court precedent.46
Walker’s and Reinhardt’s respective contributions to the law of the
U.S. Constitution are novelties, but hardly surprising. They are the
last necessary steps in the inexorable logic of a juridically enforceable
right to “the pursuit of happiness” as the removal of “uneasiness.” A
refusal to grant legal recognition to same-sex union causes “uneasiness” to those who would find some or even much happiness in the
expressive value, as well as the other benefits, of legal recognition of
their homosexual union. But note that any legal enforcement of moral
judgment always will cause uneasiness for some, except in an imagined
world in which all are already virtuous.47 To the extent the Lockean
definition of happiness stands, laws rooted in moral judgment must
fall.
Back in reality, however, recognition of the twin facts of Creation
and The Fall is the kiss of death for such a magical world bereft, simultaneously, of both morality and uneasiness. Ample attention to the
consequences of our being created and also fallen, furthermore, focuses the mind on why the point and justification of law and government are not just giving people what they happen to want by the removal
of “uneasiness.” It is, instead, about giving them the help they need to

43. Id. at 1101.
44. Id. at 1102 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996)).
45. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 582 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
46. Perry, 671 F.3d at 1102.
47. I should add that even a perfectly virtuous people would require the exercise of political (and other) authority. See Yves R. Simon, A General Theory of Authority 47–50 (1962).

335

BYU Journal of Public Law

[Vol. 27

achieve their summum bonum, which is discovered not invented.

V. What Human Beings Are For
Or is it? “It may seem quite obvious,” philosopher Michael J.
White observes,
[T]hat political organization—that whole governmental complex of
legislative, administrative, and judicial machinery associated with residents of a particular geographical area during some temporal period—has some function, purpose, or point. Political machinery
should do something for us individually—and perhaps collectively.
Otherwise, why bother with it?48

Indeed, but, “[o]n the other hand,” White continues:
[I]t may not seem at all obvious, at least to us inhabitants of Western
constitutional states at the beginning of the third millennium, that
human beings have any such function or point. We humans just seem
to be here—with all our individual desires and aversions, our
strengths, weaknesses, virtues, and vices, our abilities and accomplishments.49

The ensuing absurdity is apparent, as White helps us to see:
So political philosophy is charged with giving a rich account of the
proper role of political organization without appeal to any conception (which would almost certainly be controversial) of what human
beings are for—that is, without any rich conception of human nature,
function, or purpose . . . . 50

In other words, political philosophy is charged with giving an account of the point of governing for a class of pointless governed, except
to the extent that the point of the governed is constituted by all and
only what they happen to come up with as their point(s). The resulting
dilemma or, rather, impossibility is that,
[t]hrough its judicial organ, government will always appear either to
be in arrears on the scope of liberty (always catching up to the latest
revisions and concepts of free selfhood), or to be arbitrary in the way
it sets determinate limits (the very purpose of which is to make power
predictable) . . . . [A]s to rights, the Court is caught in the perpetual

48. Michael J. White, Political Philosophy 3 (2d ed. 2012).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 5.
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cycle of being over- and under-inclusive.51

To be adequate to the right to liberty as conceived by Locke, the
Court would have to be clairvoyant.
Approaching the issue from another angle, before Lawrence, those
seeking to challenge government regulation bore the burden of
demonstrating that their fundamental rights were being violated or, in
other words, that government was violating the natural law. Under
Lawrence, however, there would now seem to be a “presumption of liberty,” with the result that when faced with a plausible claim to an exercise of liberty, government must justify the regulation.52 But, by its
own proud profession, the Court lacks the resources to do so, because,
as it said in Lawrence: “Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not
to mandate our own moral code.”53
To be sure, this idea, of defining liberty without making moral
judgments, is incoherent and utterly impossible—and this is exactly the
point that needs to be made in the face of such solemn but absurd assertions. It is simply not possible “to define the liberty of all” without
making judgments that are moral, that is, about what should or should
not be done. And this just is the perennial domain of human practical
reason, the natural law, and the divine law. In the same breath with
which it claimed not to be reaching moral judgments (“not to mandate
our moral code”), the Lawrence Court enacted its own preferred moral
theory. No rational person can fail to see that a vindication of liberty
still requires distinguishing it from license. The “liberty” to torture
innocent children is not going to be recognized as a matter of legal
“right,” no matter how “essential” someone may think it is to his selfdefinition. For example, in arguing for “boundless respect”—boundless!!!—for individual conscience and consequent liberty, Martha
Nussbaum promptly retreats: “this principle does not imply that all
religions and views of life must be (equally) respected by government .
. . . If people seek to torture children . . . citing their religion as their

51. Russell Hittinger, Liberalism and the American Natural Law Tradition, 25 Wake Forest
L. Rev. 429, 494 (1990).
52. Randy Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty 253–69 (2004); see also Patrick McKinley Brennan, The Individual Mandate, Sovereignty, and
the Ends of Good Government: A Reply to Professor Randy Barnett, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1623, 1640–
48 (2011).
53. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)).
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reason, their claims must be resisted even though they may be sincere.”54 Mirabile dictu, there turn out to be perfectly firm moral bounds
on what was boldly, but wrongly described as “boundless.” And this is
as it should be, but not just in the breech.55
Some philosophers can see what an increasing number of American jurists cannot see: “the claim that it is not possible to legislate morality is both false and absurd.”56 Governments legislate morality all
the time, and the only important question is whose morality will be legislated. Why should Locke’s moral theory or John Stuart Mill’s be the
presumptively privileged one? The Greco-Catholic tradition counters
that it is the morality given by the natural law and clarified by the divine law that is to be our guide, the basic precepts of which law are: to
preserve its own being, to engage in sexual intercourse with a person
of the opposite sex, to rear and educate offspring, “and to know the
truth about God, and to live in society.”57 These, in barest outline, are
the rudiments of man’s earthly summum bonum. To it is added, by the
grace of redemption, his supernatural summum bonum, enjoyment of
the supernatural common good. It is the role of the state to assist man
in the achievement of both,58 and for that the state needs the assistance
and cooperation of the Church, because, as Benjamin Rush wrote,
“nothing but the gospel of Jesus Christ will effect the mighty work of
making nations happy.”59
I now turn to this last point, the role of the Church.

54. Martha C. Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience: In Defense of America’s Tradition of Religious Equality 19, 24 (2008) (emphasis omitted).
55. The two preceding paragraphs are adapted from Patrick McKinley Brennan, The Place
of ‘Higher Law’ in the Quotidian Practice of Law: Herein of Practical Reason, Natural Law, Natural
Rights, and Sex Toys, 7 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 437, 469–70 (2009).
56. John M. Rist, Real Ethics: Rethinking the Foundations of Morality 130
(2002).
57. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica pt. I-II, question 94, art. 2 (Fathers of the
English Dominican Province trans., 1947) (1274).
58. This requires recovering the understanding of the state that Hobbes and Locke, along
with Jean Bodin and others, demolished.
In the sixteenth century the word ‘state’ itself came to indicate less the community or
society as a whole than its government, itself frequently viewed as in at least potential
opposition to the citizen. Thus any state, and later even any ‘community,’ might be
perceived no longer as a means to the individual’s growth but as a threat to his autonomy.
Rist, supra note 55, at 209.
59. Patrick McKinley Brennan, The Mighty Work of Making Nations Happy: A Response to
James Davison Hunter, 39 Pepp. L. Rev. 1091, 1105 (2013).
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VI. The Care of Souls
So far I have focused on how Locke’s degraded (and degrading)
notion of happiness must be rejected in order to make cultural and
legal space for man’s summum bonum. There is yet another Lockean
legacy, though, that impedes our ability to do that very thing: the banishment of the Church. Before taking the measure of that banishment’s
consequences, we need to return briefly to another element of Locke’s
starting point.
One of the putative reasons Locke defines happiness as he does is
that he comes to the question of happiness already convinced that
“[w]e do not know what man is.”60 In Locke’s view it is not, of course,
that we know nothing about man. What we do not know, pace the
Greco-Catholic tradition, is man as a substance,—that is, man as a hylomorphic unity of body and soul with a hierarchy of given ends, fulfillment of which constitutes his summum bonum. As Pierre Manent has
written, “[t]hat man is a substance and one substance, that is the Carthago
delenda of the new philosophy”61 of which Locke is the exemplary developer.
In the universe of Locke’s philosophy, man knows that he is an
animal, and, in fact, fear of hunger is what drives man from the (imaginary) “state of nature” into the “bonds of civil society.”62 To quote
Manent again, “Locke will erect the lofty structure of the liberal . . .
state on the puny base of the solitary animal in search of food.”63 What
can no longer provide the base of politics, as it had in the Greco-Catholic tradition, is knowledge of man as a substance. Locke makes clear
in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding that moral notions are
arbitrary artifacts of man, not given or guaranteed by nature.64 GrecoCatholic thought sought to know man and to be guided by what was
proper to him, not exclusively by his animality. “Modern thought,” by
contrast,
despairs that men will ever agree on what is proper to man, on human
substance or ends, and thus it wants to bracket the question of what
is proper to man. It seeks to keep man in his efficacious indetermina-

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Manent, supra note 6, at 124.
Id. at 113.
See Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, supra note 10, at 57–58.
Manent, supra note 6, at 124.
Id. at 117.
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tion so that, by taking his bearings from what is not human but animal and thus determined and necessary, he might construct a human
world whose order is independent of human opinions, where man
can affirm himself without knowing himself, where he can be free.65

Locke is quite serious about how little we can know about man.
For example, he holds that the idea of murder is “arbitrary.”66 Likewise, the question concerning man’s summum bonum is, as Locke sees
it, as pointless as the question “whether the best relish were to be found
in apples, plumbs, or nuts.”67 And for those who would relish it, polygamy is, as people today like to say, “an option:” “He that is already
married may marry another woman . . . . The ties, duration, and conditions of the left hand marriage shall be no other than what is expressed in the contract of marriage between the parties.”68
Men who can know so little of themselves would benefit, one
might think, from the supernatural teaching authority of the Church
on matters of faith and morals. This, though, Locke-the-tolerant will
not tolerate.
On the one hand, Locke postulates “the Law of Toleration”69 and
“the Duty of Toleration”70: “The Establishment of this one thing
would take away all ground of Complaints and Tumults upon account
of Conscience. And . . . there would remain nothing in these Assemblies that were not more peaceable, and less apt to produce Disturbance of State . . . .”71 The overarching aim of securing social peace and
quiet ensures that the Law of Toleration binds the Church as much as
it binds the state; indeed, churches must be “obliged to lay down Toleration as the Foundation of their own Liberty[,] and teach that liberty
of conscience is every mans [sic] natural Right, equally belonging to
Dissenters as to themselves . . . .”72
On the other hand, however, the Law of Toleration does not extend

65. Id. at 129.
66. Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, supra note 10, at 76.
67. John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, in The Selected Political
Writings of John Locke, supra note 7, 184, 191,
68. Locke, Political Essays, supra note 13, at 256.
69. John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration 51 (James H. Tully ed., Hackett
Publ’g Co. 1983) (1689).
70. Id. at 33.
71. Id. at 51.
72. Id.
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to papists and fanatics.73 Not just papists, but the Church herself, cannot be tolerated: “The Church can have no right to be tolerated by the
magistrate [whose members] . . . deliver themselves up to the protection and service of another prince. For by this means the magistrate
would give way to the settling of a foreign jurisdiction in his own country . . . .”74
I would not for a moment suggest that natural human reason is in
principle incapable of discovering the nature of marriage.75 My point is
that when the state is deprived of the supernatural assurances of the
Church on the nature of marriage, among other matters of life and
death, the state and its laws are at the whim of popular opinion,
whether erroneous or true. As I noted at the outset, whole cultures can
be mistaken about matters of great moral magnitude. St. Thomas, for
example, thought that the German people were ignorant of the fact
that theft is a crime.76 It is a Lockean legacy that our state’s widening
misunderstanding of marriage cannot be corrected and transformed by
the operation of the Church’s powers. The state that does not recognize that it is bound by higher law is absolute in its power, including
the power to redefine marriage by legislative ipse dixit. As historian Peter Gay has observed, “political absolutism and religious toleration
[are] the improbable twins of the modern state system.”77 In Locke’s
dispensation, man is left to take care of himself, for neither Church nor
state has care of his soul: “[T]he Care of Souls is not committed to the
Civil Magistrate, any more than to other men. . . . The care of each man’s
soul and of the things of heaven, which neither does belong to the commonwealth nor can be subjected to it, is left entirely to every man’s self.”78 In
the discarded Greco-Catholic tradition, by contrast, man could count
on Church and state to cooperate, sometimes more successfully than
others, for the good of his soul. Even the chimera of “natural law liberalism” pushed by some neo-conservatives today is incapable of cognizing and serving souls.

73. Locke, supra note 69, at 17.
74. Locke, supra note 7, at 157.
75. Cf. Sherif Girgis, Ryan Anderson & Robert George, What is Marriage? Man
and Woman: A Defense (2012).
76. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, supra note 57 at art. 4.
77. Peter Gay, The Enlightenment: The Rise of Modern Paganism 298–99 (1996),
discussed in Ferrara, supra note 14, at 99.
78. Locke, supra note 7, at 26, 48, quoted in Ferrara, supra note 14, at 95–96.
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Who got the benefit of what some have called “modernity’s wager?”79 Contemporary neo-conservatives continue to side with Locke
against the older tradition in which statecraft is soul craft. The proof
is in the pudding, however—and the present pudding is the previously
unthinkable, but perfectly logical dismantling of marriage for the purpose of removing “uneasiness” in the “pursuit of happiness.” The Declaration of Independence leads to moral independence—but not, however, to the true liberty of achieving the summum bonum. It would be
better to reckon with the consequences of what we are, which is dependent rational animals.80

VII. Making Sense of Equality
But we are not just dependent rational animals. We are rational
animals who have been created in the image and likeness of the God
who loved us into being, who redeemed all of humanity from the effects of Adam’s Fall, and who wishes us to be happy with Him in the
Kingdom for all eternity. It is a fundamental tenet of Catholic theology, however, that God does not save us all on His own. Each of us has
a role to play. God invites and even commands us to cooperate, but we
remain “free” to disobey. Either way we choose, we enjoy a breathtaking equality in that God “desires all men to be saved, and to come to
the knowledge of the truth.”81 While it is God’s consequent will that
the disobedient be damned, it is His antecedent will that all be saved.82
The debate and discourse about legal recognition of same-sex unions make much of “equality,” but except for God’s antecedent will
that all men be saved, it is hard to say in what significant respect, if any,
humans are in fact equal.83 Here, too, those committed to the sufficiency of the principles on which the nation was founded are bound to
be embarrassed. “All men are created equal,” but in respect of what?
The authors of the Declaration never say. Equality is not sameness
simpliciter. Equality is sameness in respect of some particular—but in this

79. The phrase is from Adam Seligman, Modernity’s Wager: Authority, the Self,
and Transcendence (2000).
80. See Alasdair MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals (1999).
81. 1 Timothy 2:4.
82. See John E. Coons & Patrick M. Brennan, By Nature Equal: The Anatomy
of a Western Insight 145–214 (1999); Patrick McKinley Brennan, Arguing for Human Equality, 18 J.L. & Religion 99, 144–45 (2002).
83. See Michael J. White, Partisan or Neutral: The Futility of Public Political
Theory 62–75 (1997).
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case unstated—predicate. It is trivially true that all humans are equally
possessed of human nature, but from this it does not follow that they
have an equal right, or any right at all, to do what they will. John Rawls
struggled with the question of natural human equality, and I would
venture to say even stumbled over it.84
I have just been discussing equality as a descriptive or ontological
possibility. On the related, but distinct question of equality as a normative matter—yes, of course, it is a principle of the natural law that all
men and women are normatively entitled to equal treatment “under
law.” It is equally a principle of the natural law, however, that an unjust
“law” is no law at all, and a human “law” that valorized same-sex union
would be unjust in the relevant, viz., a violation of higher law.85
True human equality consists in the Good News: the surprising
news that salvation is offered to all, but on the Offeror’s, not the offerees’, terms. This is the news the Church brings, along with the means
to bring it to completion. This is news that Locke and the nation’s
fabled founders hid under a bushel basket. It is time to put it on a pedestal and make the nation happy, by which I do not mean removing
“uneasiness.”

84. The best Rawls could come up with was a “range property.” See Patrick McKinley
Brennan, Equality, Conscience, and the Liberty of the Church: Justifying the Controversiale Per Controversialius, 54 Villanova L. Rev. 625, 632–36 (2009). On John Rawls’s own version of constructivism, see Patrick McKinley Brennan, Political Liberalism’s Tertium Quiddity: Neutral “Public
Reason,” 43 Am. J. Juris. 239, 239–51 (1998) (arguing that Rawlsianism is an attempt to “stop
history—by the rules” of political liberalism (quoting White, supra note 83, at 81)).
85. See Patrick McKinley Brennan, Law in a Catholic Framework, in Teaching the Tradition: Catholic Themes in Academic Disciplines 437 (J. Piderit & M. Morey eds., 2012).
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